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Abstract: Military and terrorist attacks or acci-
dental explosions on chemical weapons storage 
sites such as research centers, ammunition depots 
and factories can explosively release large quanti-
ties of lethal chemical agents which can affect not 
only the vicinity of ground zero but also inhabited 
and cultivated areas at large distances. The simula-
tions carried out in this work focus on the Sarin 
warfare agent while the explosive agent releases are 
assumed to occur at night (usually preferred by the 
attackers for obvious reasons). The exposed popula-
tion downwind is assumed to be unprotected, in an 
open area (e.g. in the streets), without any warning 
and thus receptors can remain immersed in the Sar-
in cloud for considerable time (at least ten minutes) 
before any protective action is taken (evacuation, 
finding shelter, receiving medical care etc.). The 
results indicate that the effects of military, terrorist 
and accidental explosions on Sarin storage areas 
could be devastating at large distances from ground 
zero as they would practically amount to gigantic 
lethal chemical weapon explosions. The models of 
this work are implemented on a case study, namely 
the April 14, 2018 military strikes on the alleged 
Syrian chemical weapons sites due to its high rele-
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vance and similarity to the Sarin releases occurred 
in the US demolition operations at the Khamisiyah 
Pit in Iraq (1991) believed to have been a possible 
source of the “Gulf War Syndrome”. According to 
this case study if Sarin agent was indeed stored in 
the alleged Syrian chemical weapons sites then var-
ious populated areas around ground zero would 
have experienced lethal or life-threatening effects, 
irreversible or other serious long-lasting adverse 
health effects or at least notable discomfort. More-
over, if the Khamisiyah Pit Sarin ammunitions 
demolition operation was indeed the source of the 
“Gulf War Syndrome” then the incontrovertible 
multiple uses of Sarin against the Syrian population 
(possibly aggravated by the April 14, 2018 attacks) 
might give rise to a similar “Syrian War Syndrome” 
which is likely to appear in the future. Forensically, 
if after the bombardment of the alleged Sarin stor-
age sites in Syria there are no symptoms of expo-
sure to Sarin in populated areas close to ground ze-
ro (predicted and mapped by the postulated scenaria 
of the present work) then that may be a strong indi-
cation that the attacks were probably unjustified 
and unfair. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is incontrovertible proof that chemical weap-
ons, especially Sarin and Chlorine, have been re-
cently used in Syria against innocent civilians. The 
civilized world has been alerted to these atrocities 
and has justifiably threatened to punish those re-
sponsible for committing crimes against humanity. 
This work will not be concerned with the identifica-
tion of the perpetrators who have not been identi-
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fied beyond reasonable doubt. Responding to that 
murderous employment of weapons of mass de-
struction the USA, the UK and France have 
launched military strikes against Syrian targets re-
ported as chemical weapons sites. However, mili-
tary and terrorist attacks against such targets or 
even accidental explosions and demolitions of 
chemical weapons can have catastrophic effects and 
produce mass casualties and environmental disaster 
at large distances from ground zero. It is the pur-
pose of this work to study such events, focusing on 
the attacks against the alleged targets in Syria. 
The critical difference between the effects of com-
bat use of chemical munitions and a bombardment 
or a terrorist attack on a chemical weapons site are 
the large quantities of chemical agents and explo-
sives involved in the latter case. In a limited chemi-
cal weapon attack single artillery shells, bombs or 
missiles are involved where the chemical agent is 
dispersed by means of relatively low energy explo-
sions (from a few hundred grams to a few kilo-
grams of TNT equivalent). When a chemical facto-
ry or an extensive chemical weapons depot is at-
tacked then the source term is orders of magnitude 
larger than the quantities filling chemical weapons 
munitions. Moreover, conventionally armed mis-
siles, bombs or VBIEDs can carry hundreds of kil-
ograms of TNT equivalent and when detonated on a 
chemical weapons depot or factory they may also 
cause the sympathetic detonation of the high explo-
sives inside the chemical munitions stored in the 
area, thus creating a powerful mechanism of initial 
chemical agent dispersion. It has been argued be-
fore (Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War 
Veterans’ Illnesses, 2008) that the so-called Gulf 
War Syndrome was not caused exclusively by the 
Depleted Uranium used by the Allied Forces 
against Iraq but it may have resulted from large 
scale chemical agent releases in the atmosphere fol-
lowing the attacks on Iraq’s chemical weapons fa-
cilities such as research centers, factories and de-
pots. Paramount among the possible sources of the 
Gulf War Syndrome is the well-known “Demolition 
Operation at the Khamisiyah Pit”. The US DOD 
has published (US DOD Technical Report, 2002) 
an extensive report of the event where an attempt 
has been made to model the explosive release of 
Sarin and Cyclosarin at Khamisiyah and the subse-
quent harmful effects on US troops. The preceding 
arguments suffice to warrant an estimation of the 
effects of a military or a terrorist attack on chemical 
weapons sites in order to inform the international 
community and especially policy and decisions 
makers about the consequences. As Sarin effects 
are orders of magnitude more lethal than those of 
Chlorine the latter will be investigated in a subse-
quent study. 
II. MODELLING AND SIMULATION 
The attacks will be simulated by using the 
EPICODE 8.0.2 (Homann & Alluzi, 2016) software 
which is extensively used by the Arms Control 
Center and is also currently a standard teaching tool 
in the author’s lectures at the Hellenic Army Acad-
emy (Weapons Sciences Course). As there is no 
credible information about the existence or the 
quantities of chemical agents stored in the sites at-
tacked the source term of the Sarin releases mod-
elled in this work will be selected according to the 
chemical agent quantities stored in an average 
chemical weapons facility. 
A. Source Term and Explosion Energy 
Chemical weapons munitions are arranged primari-
ly in the following categories: grenades, mortars, 
rockets, artillery shells, aerial bombs, spray tanks, 
chemical mines and others. With the exception of 
spray tanks all other means of delivery use high ex-
plosives (fuse+burster) to disperse chemical agents 
on targets. The total quantity of the chemical agent 
filling each munition and the high explosives used 
to disperse the agents varies from fractions of a kil-
ogram to hundreds of kilograms (US Army 
Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency, 1994). On 
the other hand, the total quantity of high explosives 
in the explosive train of the munitions 
(fuse+burster) used to disperse the agents usually 
varies from fractions of a kilogram to roughly ten 
kilograms (US Army Chemical Materiel 
Destruction Agency, 1994; TM 9-1325-200, 1966). 
Chemical weapons storage and disposal sites 
around the world may store hundreds or thousands 
of tons of chemical agents either in bulk containers 
or as chemical weapons munitions (National 
Reseach Council, 1984). Regarding the weapons of 
the attacker there is a wide range of possibilities. 
The explosion energy of modern artillery shells, 
missiles, aerial bombs, IEDs and VBIEDs ranges 
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from a few kilograms to hundreds of kilograms of 
TNT equivalent (MOABs not included). For exam-
ple a cruise Tomahawk missile (US NAVY , 2018) 
reportedly carries a 1000 lb high explosive warhead 
(unitary warhead with penetrator), a typical GP 
2000 lb aerial bomb carries (TM 43-0001-28 , 
1996; Hyde, 1997) approximately half a ton of TNT 
equivalent while artillery shells carry up to a few 
tens of kilograms of TNT equivalent (e.g. US M106 
8-inch shells filled with 38.8 lb of Comp B)  (Hyde, 
1997; TM 43-0001-28 , 1996). IEDs and VBIED’s 
explosion energies range from a few kilograms of 
TNT equivalent (pipe bombs, suitcase bombs, 
backpacks etc) to thousands of kilograms of TNT 
equivalent (e.g. trucks loaded with plastic explo-
sives, ANFO or LPG) (FEMA, 2011). Note that 
modern weapons precise technical data are classi-
fied but this is immaterial to the present study as 
they do not differ significantly from their older var-
iants in terms of explosion energy and chemical fill-
ings. 
The nature of the chemical agents themselves asso-
ciated with the attack or the accident play a signifi-
cant role in the ensuing harmful effects. Non-
persistent agents such as Sarin (GB) will quickly 
evaporate (especially in warm weather areas) and 
will not pose a risk to humans after the chemical 
cloud and the nearby pools have evaporated and the 
vapors have been diluted into higher layers of the 
atmosphere. Other persistent agents, however, such 
as Mustard Gas (HD) or VX will contaminate the 
area for a long time denying entrance to unprotect-
ed personnel and requiring large-scale decontami-
nation efforts. Chlorine dispersions, on the other 
hand, pose a much less significant risk than GB, 
HD, and VX and will not prevent first responders 
from entering the contaminated areas if they are 
equipped with protective gear. This work focuses 
on one of the most lethal agents used in Iraq and 
Syria, that is Sarin (GB), and it is only the begin-
ning of a series of reports regarding the effects of 
other important chemical weapons agents used in 
combat or against innocent civilians. 
All the scenaria in this work assume that a chemical 
weapons site storing significant quantities of Sarin 
(GB) is attacked (or suffers an accident) resulting in 
a chemical explosion that completely (100% air-
borne) disperses large quantities of Sarin. The max-
imum concentration downwind from ground zero is 
proportional to the initial source term dispersed in 
the explosion (according to the Gaussian dispersion 
model used by EPICODE). Thus, if larger or small-
er quantities are dispersed in the attack the derived 
downwind concentrations of the present simulations 
may be simply multiplied by an appropriate multi-
plicative factor to obtain a new estimation (larger or 
smaller source terms). Plausible TNT equivalents 
are selected in all cases according to the above 
analysis. Nevertheless, we can always bracket the 
effects by increasing/decreasing the TNT equiva-
lent by an order of magnitude (e.g. 10kg TNT to 
100kg TNT) and observe the sensitivity of the ef-
fects to such a variation. 
B. Meteorological Parameters 
All simulations in this study assume very unfavora-
ble weather conditions which considerably increase 
the concentration of the chemical agents close to 
the ground, thus a few comments regarding unfa-
vorable and worst-case atmospheric scenaria are 
necessary. Worst-case scenaria set upper limits of 
possible preventive and mitigation procedures 
while average reasonably unfavorable scenaria are 
indicative of the risk associated with the problem at 
hand. For example finding the absolutely worst-
case input parameters (an extremely difficult task) 
may lead to unrealistic modelling and suggest ex-
aggerated preventive and mitigations actions. Sim-
ple, plausible, unfavorable scenaria, however, can 
sometimes adequately illustrate the magnitude of 
the problem without risking being labeled extreme 
and unrealistic. 
The Gaussian dispersion model used by EPICODE 
for point sources on the ground yields maximum 
downwind concentrations for low wind speeds 
(concentrations are inversely proportional to wind 
speed) and moderately stable atmospheres (e.g. sta-
bility class F) for a wide range of deposition veloci-
ties. However, extremely small wind speed values 
will yield unrealistic results especially for zero 
deposition velocities. Even the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) recommends (EPA-
454/R-99-005, 2000) the use of a minimum wind 
speed threshold of 0.5 m/s. In addition, explosives 
releases in EPICODE (Homann & Alluzi, 2016) 
and HOTSPOT (Homann & Aluzzi, 2013) do not 
yield downwind concentrations which are inversely 
proportional to the wind speed very close to ground 
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zero due to the complex form of the source term 
which is no longer point-like but an extended 
source whose geometry is determined by the explo-
sion energy. 
Consequently, it should be emphasized that predic-
tive Gaussian model simulations in arms control 
studies must be a combination of realism and pes-
simism (unfavorable scenario adoption), while re-
constructive simulations should input the most reli-
able available input parameters from credible 
sources. For example, for obvious reasons, the at-
tacker in most cases would prefer to launch his at-
tack at night which enhances the probability of F, E 
and D Pasquill stability classes. For many practical 
purposes a Gaussian plume model with a stability 
class F and a low wind speed (such as one meter 
per second) yields sufficiently conservative results 
for ground releases (Homann & Aluzzi, 2013). 
C. Deposition Velocity 
When particulate and gaseous materials are dis-
persed in the atmosphere, they are transferred to the 
ground surface through a variety of mechanisms 
collectively described as dry deposition (in the ab-
sence of precipitation) (Sugiyama, et al., 2014). 
Accordingly, Sarin, after its explosive release (in 
the form of aerosols or vapors), will be deposited 
on the ground (and other surfaces such as trees, wa-
ter etc.) due to gravitational settling, turbulent dif-
fusion and Brownian motion while various other 
chemical and biological processes will contribute to 
the plume depletion. A crucial parameter in the dis-
persion of Sarin (and in the dispersion of any other 
atmospheric pollutant) is its deposition velocity, 
which for most gaseous and particulate materials 
dispersed into the atmosphere vary from vd=0.001 
cm/sec to vd=10 cm/sec (Sugiyama, et al., 2014). 
Sarin has a boiling point slightly larger than that of 
water, and when exposed to the high temperatures 
of an explosion (thousand degrees Celsius) a large 
quantity of the agent will be vaporized and dis-
persed with a practically zero deposition velocity. 
The rest of the agent will be either aerosolized and 
dispersed with small deposition velocities (similar 
to those associated with an explosive release of hot 
water aerosols) or form pools and hotspots in the 
vicinity of ground zero and continue to evaporate 
after the attack. Note that we are only concerned 
with dry deposition disregarding for the time being 
wet deposition velocities (i.e. due to precipitation) 
and any other mechanism of agent removal from 
the atmosphere. Large deposition velocities in-
crease the concentrations close to ground zero and 
deplete the cloud at large distances while very small 
deposition velocities (e.g. associated with vapors) 
allow the cloud to reach larger distances. The most 
conservative assumption (unrealistic) is that the 
high temperatures of the explosion completely va-
porize the entire quantity of Sarin which is then de-
posited downwind at a deposition velocity close to 
zero. Such an assumption, however, would lead to 
unrealistically large concentration estimates down-
wind even at very large distances. 
Hence, it is reasonable to bracket the effects of Sar-
in dry deposition (aerosol and vapors) by studying 
the concentrations downwind in particularly unfa-
vorable meteorological conditions assuming deposi-
tion velocities from vd=0.0 cm/s to vd=10 cm/sec 
although the most plausible dry deposition velocity 
is vd=0.3 cm/s recommended for the respirable 
component of the source term (particles with less 
than 10μm aerodynamic diameter) by EPICODE 
8.0 (Homann & Alluzi, 2016) ), HOTSPOT 3.0.3 
(Homann, 2015) and by the US DoD NARAC 
software RASCAL (US NRC RASCAL 3.0, 2000). 
It should be underlined that, even the US DoD 
modelers (running the codes HPAC/SCIPUFF) for 
explosive releases of Sarin also assumed a dry gas-
eous deposition value of 0.3 cm/sec (2000 model-
ling, (US DOD Technical Report, 2002)). In partic-
ular, DHS and CIA field tests (carried out in May 
1997) associated with the Khamisiyah incident (US 
DOD Technical Report, 2002)) suggested that when 
high explosives detonate close to 122mm rockets 
filled with Sarin they can cause the sympathetic 
detonation of the rocket’s central burster which will 
rupture the warhead releasing the liquid chemical 
agent in the vicinity of the explosion. The bulk of 
Sarin will form liquid pools soaking into the sand 
and/or raining onto other surrounding material be-
fore slowly evaporating while only a small amount 
will be instantaneously turned into a cloud of Sarin 
vapors and aerosol, which will pose a great inhala-
tion hazard due to the high volatility and vapor 
pressure of Sarin. A typical 122 mm Sarin rocket 
contained 6.3 kg of chemical agent with an agent 
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purity of approximately 50% and the ration of Sarin 
to cyclosarin was 3:1. Due to its non-specific nature 
the present work will assume 100% purity of Sarin 
(no cyclosarin, no precursors to be mixed before the 
explosion), with no degradation of the chemical 
agent although any percentage of impurity or deg-
radation will simply scale the source term and the 
concentrations downwind. 
D. Explosive dispersion of 100 tons and 100 kg of 
Sarin with 100 kg of TNT 
Let us assume that 100 tons of pure Sarin stored at 
a large chemical weapons site (National Reseach 
Council, 1984) is explosively dispersed with 100 kg 
of TNT. Such a dispersion can be caused by the 
combined explosion of a Tomahawk missile war-
head and the bursters of several chemical weapons 
munitions. Similar TNT equivalent energy yields 
can be achieved in terrorist attacks with a vehicle 
born improvised explosive device (VBID) such as a 
car loaded with explosives (FEMA, 2011). 
Running a few explosion model simulations with 
various time-averaged wind speeds ranging from 1 
m/s to 12 m/s and focusing only on night-time at-
tacks (stability classes F, E, D and zero deposition 
velocity vd=0) shows that up to a distance of one 
kilometer the maximum wind-speed associated with 
an F class stability (i.e. u=3 m/s, thickest dark blue 
line) gives lower concentrations downwind than a 
reasonably high wind speed associated with a D 
class stability (u=12 m/s, thickest orange line). This 
trend is reversed for the aforementioned weather 
parameter combinations at distances larger than one 
kilometer from ground zero. Although a quantity of 
100 tons of Sarin has been used in Figure II.1, the 
same trends will be observed for any other arbitrary 
quantity since the concentration of the chemical 
agent downwind is proportional to the source term 
(except for ground zero). For example if the quanti-
ty of Sarin dispersed in the detonation is one thou-
sand times smaller (i.e. 100 kg) then all quantities 
on the vertical axis should be divided by 1,000 (see 
Figure II.2). 
Therefore in night attacks there is a competition of 
worseness (i.e. lethality) between (Stability Class F, 
u=3 m/s) and (Stability Class D, u>3 m/s). Adopt-
ing a more plausible deposition velocity vd=0.3 
cm/sec (thick dashed lines) and a reasonable upper 
limit vd=10 cm/sec (thick dotted lines) we can 
bracket the possible concentration values down-
wind by plotting in the same color the curves corre-
sponding to the same meteorological conditions, i.e. 
three orange lines (solid, dashed, dotted) for (Sta-
bility Class D, u=12 m/s) and three blue lines (sol-
id, dashed, dotted) for (Stability Class F, u=3 m/s). 
 
 
Figure II.2: Sarin plume centerline concentration with re-
spect to downwind distance from ground zero after 100 kg of 
Sarin are explosively dispersed with 100 kg TNT equivalent. 
A night attack is assumed with wind speeds ranging from 1 
m/sec to 12 m/sec and a mixing height of 1000 m. Blue lines 
indicate stability class F, orange lines indicate stability class 
D. Solid lines indicate deposition velocity vd=0, dashed lines 
indicate vd=0.3 cm/sec and dotted lines indicate vd=10 cm/sec 
Figure II.1: Sarin plume centerline concentration with re-
spect to downwind distance from ground zero after 100 tons 
of Sarin are explosively dispersed with 100 kg TNT equiva-
lent. A night attack is assumed with wind speeds ranging 
from 1 m/sec to 12 m/sec and a mixing height of 1000 m. Blue 
lines indicate stability class F, orange lines indicate stability 
class D. Solid lines indicate deposition velocity vd=0, dashed 
lines indicate vd=0.3 cm/sec and dotted lines indicate vd=10 
cm/sec. 
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Note that the thick dashed orange line vd=0.3 
cm/sec is indistinguishable from its solid orange 
counterpart (vd=0.0 cm/sec) in Figure II.1 and Fig-
ure II.2. On the other hand, the thick blue dotted 
line in Figure II.1 and Figure II.2 suggests that in 
the event of night attacks where a quantity of 100 
tons (100 kg) of Sarin is dispersed with an explo-
sion of 100 kg TNT there is a probability that indi-
viduals up to a distance of 85 km (10 km) down-
wind from ground zero who remain for ten minutes 
inside the Sarin plume could experience life-
threatening health effects or death as the concentra-
tion at their position can possibly be 0.37 mg/m3 
(the receptor will be in an AEGL-3 zone). 
Assuming a linear risk model the lethal probabili-
ties downwind scale with the quantities of Sarin 
released therefore the risk at a certain distance from 
ground zero associated with the dispersion of 100 
tons of Sarin is one thousand times larger than the 
risk associated with the dispersion of 100 kg of Sar-
in. Regarding the more plausible scenario of the 
explosive release of 100 kg of Sarin with 100 kg of 
TNT (Stability Class F, u=3 m/sec, Mixing 
Height=1000, vd=0.3 cm/sec, see thick dashed blue 
lines in Figure II.2) EPICODE yields the following 
output: the AEGL-3 zone (life-threatening health 
effects or death) can reach distances of 24 km 
downwind covering an area of 8.9 km2, the AEGL-
2 zone (irreversible or other serious, long-lasting 
adverse health effects) can reach distances of 54 km 
downwind covering an area of 34 km2 and finally 
the AEGL-1 zone (discomfort, irritation, or certain 
asymptomatic non-sensory effects) can reach dis-
tances larger than 200 km downwind covering an 
area of 303 km2. In the event that 100 tons of Sarin 
are dispersed with the same quantity of TNT 
EPICODE predicts that all three AEGL zones will 
exceed a distance of 200 km covering areas as fol-
lows AEGL-3 (4000 km2), AEGL-2 (6000 km2), 
AEGL-1 (8000 km2). The average population den-
sity in Syria is approximately 100 people per km2 
(2018) therefore the explosive release of 100 kg of 
Sarin after an attack on its alleged remaining chem-
ical weapons sites could theoretically cause several 
thousand deaths and tens of thousands of victims 
suffering irreversible health effects. It is now obvi-
ous that a more focused study should be carried out 
regarding Syria focusing on the alleged chemical 
weapons sites that were targeted by the allied forc-
es. 
III. THE APRIL 14, 2018 MILITARY ATTACKS 
AGAINST THE ALLEGED CHEMICAL WEAPONS SITES IN 
SYRIA 
The world has witnessed many times the use of 
chemical weapons (especially Sarin and Chlorine) 
in Syria against innocent civilians. On April 14, 
2018 at 04:00 Syrian time, the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France launched coordinated 
missile attacks (mainly with SLCM, ALCM) 
against alleged chemical weapons sites in Syria. 
Reportedly, the attacks were in response to the al-
leged Syrian government use of chemical weapons 
against innocent civilians - an accusation denied by 
the Syrian government. The strikes began at 9 pm 
EDT, April 13 (04:00, April 14, in Syria) targeting 
with missiles three sites (Rocha, et al., 2018; US 
DoD, 2018): The Barzah research center located in 
Barzeh Damascus, an alleged chemical weapons 
storage facility near Homs (Him Shinshar), and an 
alleged equipment storage facility and command 
post also near Homs. The weapon of choice was 
again (Gearan & Ryan, 2018) the Tomahawk mis-
sile whose actual yield (in TNT equivalent) is a 
significant input parameter in this report. Various 
other missiles were used during the April 14, 2018 
operation such as the joint air-to-surface standoff 
missiles, Storm Shadow missiles, SCALP cruise 
missiles etc. (US DoD, 2018). However, their TNT 
equivalent will be covered by the range of 10 kg to 
100 kg TNT that will be postulated for the Toma-
hawk missiles. 
A. Tomahawk Cruise Missiles Fundamentals 
The main weapon used by the USA in the April 14, 
2018 attacks against Syria was the Tomahawk 
cruise missile (Gearan & Ryan, 2018) which can 
carry unitary or submunition warheads. Unitary 
warheads are actually kinetic energy penetrators 
(extremely hard penetrating devices) carrying as 
protective capsules inside them a quantity of high 
explosives to be detonated inside the target. Unitary 
(kinetic energy) warheads are used against hard 
and/or buried targets such as weapons production 
and storage facilities which are relevant to the pre-
sent study. On the other hand, submunition war-
heads are actually clusters of bomblets which are 
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used against soft targets such as military air bases 
with parked aircrafts, trucks, personnel in the open, 
radar sites, tent cities etc. There are many variants 
of Tomahawk missiles as of 2014 (BLOCK 
I,II,III,IV) (Jones, 2014) with various degrees of 
complexity and sophistication. Unitary warheads, 
which are of particular interest here, usually have 
(Hewish, 1998; US NAVY , 2018) an approximate 
weight of 450 kg, a diameter of about 50 cm and an 
impact velocity of about 260 m/sec to 335 m/sec. 
Impact angles vary from 30° to 90° (relative to the 
target surface). 
Tomahawk missiles (Tsipis, 1983; Hewish, 1998; 
Lewis & Postol, 1992; US NAVY , 2018) penetrate 
hard targets either relying solely on the kinetic en-
ergy of their hardened warhead (kinetic energy 
penetrator plus high explosives inside) or by using a 
multiple warhead system which consist of forward-
mounted shaped-charge devices and the main kinet-
ic energy penetrator. The precursor devices are de-
signed to precondition the hard target for defeat by 
either thickening its wall or, if possible, forming a 
channel along the line of sight so that the follow-
through kinetic energy penetrator, which is the 
main warhead carrying the bulk of high explosives, 
can penetrate more effectively and detonate inside 
the target. The precise TNT equivalent of the high 
explosives carried either by the forward-mounted 
shaped-charge warheads or by the main kinetic en-
ergy penetrator warhead is classified. However, 
various sources converge on an approximate total 
weight of 450 kg (Tsipis, 1983; Hewish, 1998; 
Lewis & Postol, 1992) for the warhead which car-
ries a quantity of (Hewish, 1998) 23 kg to 135 kg of 
high explosives. Unburnt fuel remaining in the mis-
sile at the time of warhead detonation is another 
crucial parameter as it will be ignited and increase 
the energy of the explosion (for example a BGM-
109 missile carried 272 kg of fuel and modern 
Tomahawk variants are expected to carry similar 
amounts). Based on the preceding analysis it is very 
reasonable to assume that a Tomahawk missile uni-
tary warhead can have a yield ranging at least from 
10 kg TNT to 100 kg TNT (the upper limit of this 
conservative assumption has already been used Sec-
tion II). 
B. Simulating the missile attacks against the Bar-
zah Research Center 
The Barzah research center and the Him Shinshar 
site near Homs were reportedly attacked on the as-
sumption (US DoD, 2018) that they were chemical 
weapons sites, with the former allegedly being a 
chemical weapons research center and the latter a 
chemical weapons depot. If there was indeed Sarin 
stored in these sites the Tomahawk kinetic energy 
penetrators, which totally destroyed the sites ac-
cording to post-attack footage and public infor-
mation (US DoD, 2018), would have certainly 
breached the Sarin containers or the chemical muni-
tions. The high explosives of the warheads (plus the 
yield of their shaped-charge precursors and the re-
maining fuel) would have dispersed the chemical 
agent around ground zero while the chemical cloud 
generated by the explosion would have been carried 
downwind. Non-vaporized liquid Sarin would have 
formed pools and hotspots in the area which would 
then begin to vaporize creating a residual Sarin 
plume. Historical weather data for Damascus indi-
cate that (Time & Date, n.d.; US DoD, 2018) at the 
time of attacks (04:00, April 14, 2018 – Syrian 
time) in Damascus (approximately 5.5 km south-
Figure III.1: Sarin plume centerline concentration with re-
spect to downwind distance from ground zero for a postulat-
ed night attack on the alleged chemical weapons site at the 
Barzah Scientific Research Center. The postulated scenario 
assumes that 1 kg of Sarin is dispersed by a Tomahawk war-
head explosion with two different yields (10 kg TNT equiva-
lent - blue lines) and (100 kg TNT equivalent - red lines) and 
two different deposition velocities (vd=0.3 m/sec - solid lines) 
and (vd=10 m/sec - dashed lines). Other meteorological pa-
rameters are as follows: Stability Class F, wind speed u=3 
m/sec, Inversion Height=1000 m. 
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west of the Barzah center) there was a SW wind 
with an average speed of approximately 10 km/h 
(2.77 m/sec) and an average temperature of 12°C 
(these relatively low temperatures lasted until 07:00 
and doubled by 16:00). Given the overall uncertain-
ties of the historical weather data the postulated at-
tack scenario on the Barzah research center will be 
modelled by assuming the explosive dispersal of 
one, ten and one hundred kilograms of Sarin with 
explosions of ten and one hundred kg TNT with 
deposition velocities ranging from 0.3 cm/sec to 10 
cm/sec. According to Section II night hours with 
low wind speeds (~3 m/sec) suggest a stability class 
F. We will also assume an average inversion height 
of 1000 m. The relatively low temperature will 
lower the plume evaporation rate for hours which is 
an additional negative factor. In an actual missile 
attack its warhead will explode after penetrating the 
structures where Sarin has been stored and there-
fore the actual release of the agent into the atmos-
phere is not easily modelled and predictable as has 
already been underlined. Various factors such as the 
walls of the target and the ensuing debris from the 
demolished target would reduce the amount of Sar-
in which would be rendered airborne. Due to these 
inevitable uncertainties, the postulated scenaria in 
this work are very conservative as they disregard all 
barriers which could prevent the dispersion of the 
Sarin plume into the atmosphere after the explo-
sion. 
Figures III.1,2,3 show the Sarin centerline concen-
trations downwind with respect to distance from 
ground zero for a postulated night attack on the al-
leged chemical weapons sites in Syria. The postu-
lated scenario assumes that 1 kg, 10 kg and 100 kg 
of Sarin are dispersed by a Tomahawk warhead ex-
plosion of 10 kg TNT equivalent (blue lines) and 
100 kg TNT equivalent (red lines) with deposition 
velocities of vd=0.3 m/sec (solid lines) and vd=10 
m/sec (dashed lines) (Stability Class F, wind speed 
u=3 m/sec, Inversion Height=1000 m are assumed 
in all cases). Figure III.1 shows that in the event of 
the explosive dispersion of one kilogram of Sarin 
with 10 kg of TNT equivalent and a deposition ve-
locity vd=0.3 cm/sec individuals remaining im-
mersed in the Sarin plume at distances up to 4.1 km 
downwind for ten minutes may experience life 
threatening effects (AEGL-3 concentration: 0.37 
mg/m3). 
 
Figure III.2: Sarin plume centerline concentration with re-
spect to downwind distance from ground zero for a postulated 
night attack on the alleged chemical weapons site at the Bar-
zah Scientific Research Center. The postulated scenario as-
sumes that 10 kg of Sarin are dispersed by a Tomahawk war-
head explosion with two different yields (10 kg TNT equiva-
lent - blue lines) and (100 kg TNT equivalent - red lines) and 
two different deposition velocities (vd=0.3 m/sec - solid lines) 
and (vd=10 m/sec - dashed lines). Other meteorological pa-
rameters are as follows: Stability Class F, wind speed u=3 
m/sec, Inversion Height=1000 m. 
Figure III.3: Sarin plume centerline concentration with re-
spect to downwind distance from ground zero for a postulated 
night attack on the alleged chemical weapons site at the Bar-
zah Scientific Research Center. The postulated scenario as-
sumes that 100 kg of Sarin are dispersed by a Tomahawk 
warhead explosion with two different yields (10 kg TNT 
equivalent - blue lines) and (100 kg TNT equivalent - red 
lines) and two different deposition velocities (vd=0.3 m/sec - 
solid lines) and (vd=10 m/sec - dashed lines). Other meteoro-
logical parameters are as follows: Stability Class F, wind 
speed u=3 m/sec, Inversion Height=1000 m. 
Journal of Arms Control, Defense & Security Studies Volume 1, Issue 1, (2018) 
© Arms Control Center, http://www.ArmsControl.eu Online Publication Date: May 23, 2018 
 Page 8 of 17  
Theodore E. Liolios, Konstantinos G. Kolovos: Military and Terrorist Attacks against chemical weapons sites and the 
prospect of a “Syrian War Syndrome” 
 
Likewise, under the same input parameters recep-
tors up to a distance of 10 km (AEGL-2 concentra-
tion: 0.086 mg/m3) downwind could experience se-
rious health effects (some long-lasting and irre-
versible) and finally people standing for the same 
time at distances up to 38 km downwind from 
ground zero might complain for irritation and nota-
ble discomfort (AEGL-1 concentration: 0.0069 
mg/m3). If the deposition velocity is larger (vd=10 
cm/sec) the above three distances are reduced to 
2.2km/3.6km/6.9km respectively (AEGL-3/2/1). 
According to the same Figure III.1 on the other 
hand, if one kilogram of Sarin is dispersed with 100 
kg of TNT the above AEGL-3/3/1 maximum dis-
tances for deposition velocities of 0.3 cm/sec and 
10 cm/sec respectively are 0.33 km/3.7 km /16 km 
and 0.2 km/3 km/8 km. Finally, Figure III.3 sug-
gests that the dispersion of 100 kg of Sarin with 10 
kg (100 kg) TNT would extend the AEGL-3/2/1 
zones up to distances of (vd=0.3 cm/sec): 50(24) 
km/94(54) km/191(200+) km and (vd=10 cm/sec): 
8.4(10) km/11(17) km/15(36) covering respective 
areas of (vd=0.3 cm/sec): 26(8.9) km2/78(34) 
km2/294(303) km2 and (vd=10 cm/sec): 1.6(2.6) 
km2/3.0(0.027) km2/5.8(0.033) km2. 
Naturally, Figure III.1, Figure III.2 and Figure III.3 
indicate that the larger the quantities of Sarin re-
leased in the postulated scenario the larger the max-
imum distances and the covered areas for the three 
AEGL-3/2/1 risk zones. The striking outcome of 
the previous calculations is that if kilograms (hun-
dreds of kilograms) of Sarin are dispersed from a 
typical chemical weapons site with small quantities 
of explosives (~10 kg TNT) and the plume travels 
uninhibited downwind then there is a probability 
that unprotected people who remain immersed in 
the cloud downwind for at least ten minutes may 
experience lethal or serious adverse health effects 
tens (hundreds) of kilometers away from ground 
zero. Owing to the large errors associated with the 
direction of the wind, risk assessment and predic-
tions as well as evacuation and mitigation decisions 
should not be based exclusively on the idealized 
cigar-shaped isodose contours of the Gaussian 
model. Rather, to eliminate uncertainties and errors 
associated with wind direction variability a 360° 
potential hazard circular zone should also be 
mapped and considered. Accordingly, Figure III.4. 
shows three concentric circular risk zones (centered 
on the Barzah Research Center) AEGL-3 (red), 
AEGL-2 (green), AEGL-1 (blue) and consists of 
two maps adjacent to each other where the lower 
one is obviously a magnification of the upper one. 
The three inner circular risk zones (red, green, blue) 
correspond to the dispersion of 1 kg of Sarin (360° 
Risk Zone Radii: 4.1km/10km/38km) while the 
three outer ones (red, green, blue) correspond to the 
dispersion of 100 kg of Sarin (360° Risk Zone Ra-
dii: 104km/153km/200km 50km/94km/191km). 
Obviously, the radii of the circular risk zones are 
the maximum distances at which a particular AEGL 
zone can extend (as predicted by EPIcode). Both 
scenaria (1 kg and 100 kg of Sarin) assume 10-min 
exposures, night attacks with an explosion of 10 kg 
TNT equivalent and the following meteorological 
parameters: stability class F, wind speed 3 m/sec, 
Mixing Height 1000 m, deposition velocity 0.3 
cm/sec (the lower map only shows the AEGL-3 and 
AEGL-2 zones). 
A more realistic hazard prediction relies on the iso-
dose contours derived by EPIcode which also cal-
culates the areas enclosed by the three AEGL zones 
for the postulated Sarin explosive releases. Figure 
III.5 consists of two adjacent Google maps showing 
the Gaussian model predictions (cigar-shaped iso-
dose contours) for the two postulated Sarin releases 
from the Barzah Research Center, namely 1 kg of 
Sarin (above) and 100 kg of Sarin (below). The 
contours are derived assuming an explosion of 10 
kg TNT equivalent and the meteorological condi-
tions that existed during the April 14, 2018 attack 
(see subsection II.B). Sarin plumes would create 
three AEGL-3/2/1 zones (10-min exposure) with 
maximum distances plotted in Figure III.1 and Fig-
ure III.3 which would cover areas as follows (1 
kg/100 kg): AEGL-3 (0.33km2/26km2) AEGL-2 
(1.5km2/78 km2) AEGL-1 (18 km2/294 km2). 
The average population density of Syria is about 
100 inhabitants per km2, thus to obtain the number 
of people expected to be inside a particular AEGL 
risk zone the aforementioned areas should be mul-
tiplied by 100. Note that due to the meteorological 
conditions during the attack the three AEGL zones 
would probably be covering areas to the north-east 
of the Barzah Research Center which is a rather 
sparsely populated area. Fortunately, considering 
the wind direction during the attack Damascus was 
located upwind and therefore the capital of Syria 
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Figure III.4: Three concentric circular risk zones (centered on the Barzah Research Center) AEGL-3 (red), AEGL-2 (green), 
AEGL-1 (blue). The three inner circular risk zones correspond to the dispersion of 1 kg of Sarin (Risk Zone Radii:  
4.1km/10km/38km) while the three outer ones to the dispersion of 100 kg of Sarin (Risk Zone Radii: 50km/94km/191km). Both 
Sarin scenaria assume 10-min exposures, night attacks with an explosion of 10 kg TNT equivalent and the following meteorolog-
ical parameters: stability class F, wind speed 3 m/sec, Mixing Height 1000 m, deposition velocity 0.3 cm/sec (see text). The lower 
map is a magnification of the area around ground zero and only shows the AEGL-3 and AEGL-2 for the dispersion of 1 kg of 
Sarin. 
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Figure III.5: EPIcode isodose contours for the explosive release of 1 kg of Sarin (above) and 100 kg of Sarin (below) from the 
Barzah Research Center assuming an explosion of 10 kg TNT equivalent and the meteorological conditions that existed during 
the April 14, 2018 attack (see text). Sarin plumes would create three AEGL-3/2/1 zones (10-min exposure) with maximum dis-
tances which would cover areas as follows (1 kg/100 kg): AEGL-3 (0.33km2/26km2) AEGL-2 (1.5km2/78 km2) AEGL-1 (18 
km2/294 km2). The average population density of Syria is about 100 inhabitants per km2, thus to obtain the number of people 
expected to be inside a particular AEGL risk zone the aforementioned areas should be multiplied by 100. 
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Figure III.6: The upper map shows three concentric circular risk zones (centered on the Him Shinshar alleged chemical weap-
ons storage facility) AEGL-3 (red), AEGL-2 (green), AEGL-1 (blue). The three inner circular risk zones correspond to the dis-
persion of 1 kg of Sarin (Risk Zone Radii: 4.1km/10km/38km) while the three outer ones to the dispersion of 100 kg of Sarin 
(Risk Zone Radii: 50km/94km/191km). Both Sarin scenaria assume 10-min exposures, night attacks with an explosion of 10 kg 
TNT equivalent and the following meteorological parameters: stability class F, wind speed 3 m/sec, Mixing Height 1000 m, dep-
osition velocity 0.3 cm/sec (see text). The lower map is a close-up image of the targets before the attack. 
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would not be likely to experience any significant 
symptoms if the postulated quantities of Sarin re-
leased by the explosion were small (a few kilo-
grams). 
However, even if only a few kilograms of Sarin had 
been explosively released then people living a few 
kilometers to the north-east of the Barzah research 
center would most likely experience at least some 
notable discomfort. 
Regarding the attack on the alleged chemical weap-
ons storage facility near Homs (Him Shinshar) an 
implementation of the EPIcode models yields the 
concentric circular risk zones AEGL-3 (red), 
AEGL-2 (green), AEGL-1 (blue) which are now 
centered on the Him Shinshar installation (see Fig-
ure III.6). Note that under certain weather condi-
tions the explosive dispersion of one kilogram of 
Sarin from Him Shinshar could affect people as far 
as Tartus while under the recorded weather condi-
tions even such a small amount of Sarin could 
cause irreversible adverse health effects on people 
living in Homs. Likewise, the explosive dispersion 
of 100 kg of Sarin from Him Shinshar could cause 
serious adverse health effects in Damascus, which 
however at the time of attack was located upwind 
which minimized the risk of exposure. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 
As this research report is expected to be of interest 
to a large audience with limited background on 
chemical weapons effects it is imperative that the 
conclusions should also be in the form of an execu-
tive summary. The criminal use of chemical weap-
ons in Syria is undeniable; however the perpetrators 
have not been identified beyond reasonable doubt. 
In this study a series of simulations are performed 
to predict and assess the effects of explosive releas-
es of Sarin from chemical weapons sites such as 
research centers, factories and ammunition depots. 
The simulations are carried out by means of the 
EPIcode software while its input parameters gov-
erning the postulated attacks and/or accidents on a 
chemical weapons site are constrained within realis-
tic ranges of values. The most critical constraints 
are the time of attack, the relevant meteorological 
conditions during the attack, the yield of the explo-
sion and the source term (quantity) of Sarin dis-
persed. Regarding large Sarin storage sites, accord-
ing to the simulations analyzed in detail in this 
work the explosive release of 100 kg of Sarin with 
100 kg of TNT (e.g. a Tomahwak missile explo-
sion) during a night attack with a gentle breeze and 
a moderately stable atmosphere could cause life-
threatening health effects or death (AEGL-3) up to 
distances of 24 km downwind covering an area of 
8.9 km2 and irreversible or other serious, long-
lasting adverse health effects (AEGL-2) up to dis-
tances of 54 km downwind covering an area of 34 
km2 and finally it could cause discomfort, irritation, 
or certain asymptomatic non-sensory effects 
(AEGL-1) at distances larger than 200 km down-
wind covering an area of 303 km2. In the event that 
100 tons of Sarin are dispersed with the same quan-
tity of TNT then all the three AEGL-3/2/1 risk 
zones will exceed a distance of 200 km covering 
areas as follows AEGL-3 (4000 km2), AEGL-2 
(6000 km2), AEGL-1 (8000 km2). 
The April 14, 2018 missile attacks carried out by 
the United States, the United Kingdom and France 
against alleged chemical weapons sites in Syria 
alerted the Arms Control Center as these attacks 
could possibly have catastrophic effects in the area. 
A great source of concern was that, if the targets 
were indeed Sarin storage sites, a military attack on 
them would result in explosive releases of large 
quantities of Sarin, which is what had happened 
during the US demolition operations at the Kham-
isiyah Pit in Iraq (1991) believed to have been a 
possible source of the “Gulf War Syndrome”. Thus, 
after simulating a random release of 100 kg and 100 
tons of Sarin (large storage sites) with a powerful 
100 kg TNT explosion (compatible with yields ex-
pected in military and terrorist attacks) this work 
focused on a case study, namely the April 14, 2018 
missile attacks against Syria. Using appropriate me-
teorological and weapons data all the parameters of 
the attacks were restricted within a reasonable 
range of values. For each attack a reasonable explo-
sive yield range was postulated which could result 
from a combination of missile and chemical muni-
tions explosions (terrorist attacks and accidents are 
obviously covered by the same scenaria). The simu-
lations assumed that the night attacks on the alleged 
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Sarin weapons sites in Syria (Barzah Research Cen-
ter, Him Shinshar) resulted in the explosive disper-
sion of 1 kg, 10 kg and 100 kg of Sarin with 10 kg 
TNT and 100 kg TNT, respectively, adopting the 
meteorological parameters that existed at the time 
of attack and two reasonably constraining values 
for the deposition velocity (0.3 cm/sec, 10 cm/sec). 
Sarin plume centerline concentrations were plotted 
with respect to distance downwind for the above 
parameters and the results were also illustrated on 
Google Earth Maps in two forms: Three AEGL-
3/2/1 concentric circular risk zones around ground 
zero and two AEGL-3/2 isodose contours, with the 
former showing a 360° risk zone to allow for wind 
direction uncertainties and the latter showing a 
more precise footprint of the AEGL zones. In the 
main text there are detailed data and analysis for 
each particular simulation of this report, however 
the results mapped in Figure III.4, Figure III.5, and 
Figure III.6, illustrate vividly the dimensions of the 
postulated hazard which, given the uncertainties of 
the Gaussian models, can be expressed as follows: 
If kilograms (hundreds of kilograms) of Sarin are 
dispersed from a typical chemical weapons site 
with an explosion of few kilograms TNT and the 
plume travels uninhibited downwind then there is a 
probability that unprotected people who remain 
immersed in the cloud downwind for at least ten 
minutes may experience lethal or serious adverse 
health effects tens (hundreds) of kilometers away 
from ground zero and the corresponding risk zones 
can cover a few square kilometers (a few hundred 
square kilometers). 
For example the explosive dispersion of (1 kg/100 
kg) Sarin with 10 kg of TNT would create three 
AEGL-3/2/1 zones which would cover areas as fol-
lows: AEGL-3 (0.33km2/26km2) AEGL-2 
(1.5km2/78 km2) AEGL-1 (18 km2/294 km2) and 
would extend up to distances of AEGL-3 
(4.1km/50km), AEGL-2 (10km/94km) and AEGL-
1 (38km/191km). The average population density 
of Syria is about 100 inhabitants per km2, thus to 
obtain the number of people expected to be inside a 
particular AEGL risk zone the aforementioned are-
as should be multiplied by 100. 
The undeniable scientific result of this report is that 
even if a few kilograms of Sarin had been explo-
sively released from the alleged chemical weapons 
sites targeted in Syria then hundreds to thousands of 
people would have experienced lethal or serious 
irreversible health effects. Moreover, if the Sarin 
released at the Khamisiyah Pit in Iraq (1991) is in-
deed a source of the “Gulf War Syndrome” then the 
April 14, 2018 attacks against the alleged Sarin 
sites in Syria might have generated a similar “Syri-
an War Syndrome”. The international community 
should keep monitoring the targeted areas in Syria 
for possible symptoms. However, regardless of the 
release of Sarin from the targeted sites it is obvious 
that the repeated criminal use of Sarin in Syria may 
give rise to a “Syrian War Syndrome” anyway, pos-
sibly aggravated by the April 14, 2018 attacks. 
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